A New York Times investigation found that in the weeks after Hamas’s October 7 attack, Israel severely weakened its system of security measures to make it easier to attack Gaza, and increased its efforts to find targets and kill civilians. Used flawed methods to assess risk.
The Israeli military acknowledged the changes to its rules of engagement but said they were made in the context of an unprecedented military threat and always complied with the laws of war.
Here are some of the key findings from the investigation.
Civilian damage limit increased in pre-emptive strike
In previous conflicts with Hamas, Israeli authorities were usually only allowed to put fewer than 10 civilians at risk in any given attack. In many cases the limit was five or even zero.
At the beginning of this war, the Israeli military increased that limit to 20, before lowering it in some contexts a month later. Attacks that harm more than 100 civilians will also be permitted on a case-by-case basis.
Detailed list of goals
Israel drastically increased the number of military targets it actively sought to attack. Authorities can now pursue not only the small group of senior Hamas commanders, weapons depots and rocket launchers that were the focus of earlier operations, but also thousands of low-ranking fighters as well as those indirectly involved in military affairs. Could have followed.
The limit on how many citizens can be put at risk each day has been lifted.
The military leadership summarily ordered that its forces could only afford to kill 500 civilians per day in pre-planned attacks. Two days later, this limit was also lifted, allowing officials to conduct as many strikes as they deemed legal.
The strike was carried out too quickly to check all targets properly
The pace of the bombing campaign was one of the most intense in 21st century warfare, which officials said made it difficult to properly inspect targets. Israel dropped or fired about 30,000 munitions into Gaza in the first seven weeks, at least 30 times more than the US-led coalition fired in the first seven weeks of the bombing campaign against ISIS.
A simplified risk assessment was used
Israel often used a simple statistical model to assess the risk of civilian damage: it routinely estimated the number of civilians in a building using a formula based on the level of cellphone use in the surrounding neighborhood. Where a target was believed to be hidden.
big, bad bombs
In previous wars, air forces often used “roof knockers”, a small weapon designed to give civilians some time to escape from an impending attack. From the first day of this war, Israel significantly reduced its use of rocket launchers. The military sometimes used less-accurate “dumb bombs” as well as 2,000-pound bombs.
AI used to propose goals
Israel widely used artificial intelligence systems for the first time. This helped officials analyze and sign off on targets faster, which increased the number of targets proposed by officials each day.
delayed strikes
Several hours would often elapse between when an officer examined a target and when the air force attacked it. This meant that attacks often relied on outdated intelligence.
